period. They were pursued by the policy makers who changed the courses of British and US policy after the Ruhr crisis. And they were premised on distinct British and US ground rules of pacific settlement, peaceful change and integrative co-operation between democratic states.
Who, then, were the key actors shaping Anglo-US policies in the 1920s? To be sure, their formulation and implementation did not spring from one source. Important impulses were given not only by statesmen but also by non-governmental actors, notably leading financiers. 13 This analysis, however, will deliberately focus on political rather than financial decision makers. For there were indeed official actors who became the political protagonists of peaceful change -who were instrumental in making the 'system of London and Locarno'. The bid of the US Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, to foster a transatlantic 'community of ideals, interests and purposes' in 1923/24 14 will be reassessed first, and his approach compared with the distinctly transatlantic policy of evolutionary change pursued by Britain's first Labour prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald. 15 The Anglo-US pursuit of European security in 1925 will then be re-evaluated, focusing first on the Conservative foreign secretary Austen Chamberlain and his 'noble work of appeasement' that culminated at Locarno. 16 This will be compared with US policy under his counterpart Frank Kellogg, who defined Washington's role as that of a benevolent but decidedly aloof arbiter in Europe. 17 All of these policy makers unquestionably faced challenges of political disorder that, to an unprecedented extent, were bound up with financial problems, above all with regard to reparations and inter-allied war debts. While financial expertise was often indispensable, all the problems underlying Europe's postwar instability in the 1920s ultimately required political solutions. Crucially, politicians were the only actors who could address the crux of the European situation, the unresolved security question.
The first argument of this study is that the reorientations of US and British stabilisation policies under Hughes and MacDonald fostered what was indeed the first actual peace settlement after 1918: the London reparations agreement of 1924. Forged with France and Germany, the 1924 agreement prepared the ground for Europe's 'economic peace' of the mid-1920s. This leads to the second contention, that this peace would have remained short-lived without the Locarno pact, the second 'real' postwar settlement. Locarno, in its turn inconceivable without the sea-change of London, was forged under the auspices of British diplomacy, recast by Chamberlain, but also significantly buttressed by US power. By integrating Germany, the pact founded a western-oriented international concert, which became in essence the political security framework of Europe's nascent Pax Anglo-Americana.
The challenges and premises of peaceful change in the 1920s
London and Locarno have to be understood as outcomes of a wider, essentially EuroAtlantic stabilisation process. To explore this process, the present study proposes an analytical mode markedly different from previous interpretations. Its first premise is that a precise analysis of the international consolidation which British and US policy makers could achieve after the Great War requires not only a reinterpretation of their strategies but also a fresh look at the postwar international system, the roles Britain and the United States played within it, and the underlying challenges of peaceful change. To this end, two methodological approaches will be employed: a comparative approach to national foreign-policy cultures and a systemic approach to the history of international relations. The former draws on concepts developed by Charles S. Maier for the study of domestic stabilisation after 1918, and the latter on those developed by Paul W. Schroeder for nineteenth-century European history. 18 Building on Schroeder's understanding, this article posits that the international system can only be described at one level in classical fashion as the relations, and distribution of power, between states within a given geopolitical constellation. 19 More fundamentally, it can be characterised as a system of international politics with the system, or constituent rules, of a 'shared practice', that is, the assumptions and principles actors develop and the rules they cultivate in pursuing their often conflicting aims within the framework of this common practice 20 (here, the conduct of international diplomacy). Put differently, this system could also be seen as providing the ground-rules of a game which is the same for all the players involved. They shape it not irrespective of their geopolitical position and power but chiefly according to the objectives they pursue, the means they use and, ultimately, the possibilities they open up within it.
The 'game' of twentieth-century international politics had to reckon with a new, ever more important factor largely absent in 1814 and even 1914, namely legitimacy, particularly domestic legitimacy. Transnational stabilisation efforts and bargains were only viable if they could be sustained not only in the international sphere but also in very disparate domestic force-fields. 21 Again, this was a challenge that politicians had to master in the first era of democratic mass politics on both sides of the Atlantic.
Building on these premises, it can be shown that the crucial change preceding Europe's 'relative consolidation' in the mid-1920s came in the ideas and assumptions shaping British and US approaches to this two-level process. It would alter their 'answers' to the Franco-German question. The ability of leading statesmen to embark on individual and collective learning processes was pivotal. Now they pursued different strategies if previously cherished policies, and concepts, proved inadequate. 22 Ultimately, post-First World War Europe could not be pacified through an 'effective' balance of power. It could only be consolidated if the international system's de facto pivotal powers, Britain and the United States, learned to fulfil their roles -and to promote stability. For although each was constrained -Britain financially, America politically -they were the only powers that could set and transform the groundrules of postwar international relations. And only they could induce France and Germany to follow suit. That they could achieve this was due not only to their power capabilities and geopolitical positions, but to their foreign-policy cultures, the strategies they advanced and the systemic leverage they wielded.
The First World War cast the United States into the role of the international system's rising hegemon. It became not merely the new 'world creditor' -not least of considerable French and British war debts -but the newly predominant power called upon to shape the rules of a liberal-capitalist world economy and of transatlantic relations. 23 Thus while neither having nor seeing a moral obligation to rescue the Europeans from the consequences of their own follies, Woodrow Wilson's successors faced the fundamental challenge of providing political leadership commensurate with American power.
In contrast to the rising power of the United States, the British Empire emerged from the Great War victorious but weakened. Even if the empire's expanse attained its all-time peak in 1920, postwar Britain was more than ever a 'Janus-faced' power.
24
The widely perceived danger of strategic 'over-extension', of too wide a gap between British commitments and its diminished resources was accentuated by war debts.
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Yet even if the Pax Britannica had definitely ended in 1914, Britain remained Europe's essential balancing power. In the post-1918 constellation, it was to play a critical role in ending Franco-German antagonism, not so much through military containment as by using its diplomatic power.
What, then, were the most pressing, and what the main structural challenges to peaceful change following the Great War? First, the peacemakers of Versailles had aggravated rather than overcome postwar disorder. Wilson had sought to create a radically altered system of supranational collective security based on the League of 22 There is also a new emphasis on the impact of ideas in Nations. 26 But the outcome of 1919 was an ill-founded compromise between his vision, Georges Clemenceau's quest for sécurité and David Lloyd George's search for peace and retribution. Chamberlain was not alone in thinking that it fell well short of 'real peace'. 27 Above all, the Versailles system was imposed on and excluded Germany. The as yet very unsettled Weimar Republic was isolated and beset by a 'revision syndrome' regarding Versailles. 28 At the same time, Versailles sowed the seeds for structural conflicts in eastern Europe. The borders of the newly recognised states Poland and Czechoslovakia were from the outset contested even by Weimar's most moderate leaders. Finally, of course, when the US Senate ultimately rejected Wilson's design in 1920 the settlement lost what should have become its principal underwriter. This decision became a cornerstone of Republican foreign policy in the 1920s. 29 Second, at the centre of Europe's crisis after 1919 lay the unresolved German question, coupled with the latent Franco-German antagonism. As Keynes observed, the reparations conflict which overshadowed Europe until 1923 was so intractable because it raised two hard -and inextricably linked -questions: 30 who would ultimately bolster European recovery financially -and ultimately pay for the war? and who would command the power resources that, even amid increasing international interdependence, states still regarded as essential safeguards of their security? The struggle over reparations provided the battlefield on which the future of the Versailles system was to be decided. To US Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, it kept Europe's 'whole economic and political life . . . in an atmosphere of war'. 31 Hoover's verdict points to a third and final challenge to peaceful change after 1919. While the League was sidelined, Europe could not be stabilised either by a return to prewar power politics or a reining-in of Germany by force. 32 The AngloAmerican alliance with France envisaged at Versailles never materialised and France's eastern alliances, notably with Poland and Czechoslovakia, proved insufficiently compensatory. No US or British government after 1919 could legitimate far-reaching commitments to France and the European status quo.
What manifested the limits of 'containment' politics most strikingly was France's futile quest for an 'artificial' hegemony in Europe, initiated under Raymond Poincaré after the failure of Lloyd George's 'grand design' for European reconstruction at the 1922 Genoa Conference. Deploring the lack of Anglo-US support, Poincaré finally felt compelled to seek reparations, and security, unilaterally. In January 1923, French troops occupied the strategically crucial Ruhr area. Recent studies have underlined that Poincaré did not desire the outright dismembering of Germany, but rather 'productive pawns' and agreements with Ruhr industrialists to secure German 'fulfilment' -and French preponderance. 33 Effectively, however, his course provoked both German 'passive resistance' and an escalating conflict that by late 1923 threatened to undermine the Weimar Republic politically, economically and territorially.
Both British and US policymakers viewed the effect of French policy with ever greater apprehension. 34 They would eventually intervene against a French incursion that by no means furthered European stability, anticipating Germany's division and limited control over vital coal and steel resources after 1945. Indeed, by undermining Weimar's embattled republican order, it would also have eroded European peace much earlier than 1933. 35 By November 1923, then, it had become obvious, not only for British and US observers, that there were not even the rudiments of international ground-rules to cope with the cardinal postwar problems. Crucially, while Germany's co-operation was indispensable, no ways had been found to engage it. Yet, by triggering the Ruhr conflict Poincaré provoked the crisis that would ultimately recast Anglo-US approaches and, in turn, recast transatlantic and European international relations.
The political and the 'depoliticised' path to the London settlement
The period which began with the 'return' of Britain and the United States to Europe in October-November 1923 and culminated in the London conference of July-August 1924 was the first of two formative phases in the evolution of postwar politics. The second was the subsequent gestation period preceding Locarno. By late 1925, the way for the markedly more stable Europe of the 'Locarno era' had been paved. Momentous decisions had terminated the Ruhr conflict and, more importantly, altered overall relations between the Western powers and Germany.
A comparative Anglo-US perspective reveals that essentially two -in the mid1920s mutually reinforcing -processes were beginning to transform the international system. The first was economically oriented and became known as the 'expert process'. Initiated by the US administration, it followed the design of Hughes's New Haven plan of December 1922. Hughes intended to overcome the reparations conundrum by allowing financial experts to propose a solution. Subsequently, Europe's political pacification was to be fostered by economic stabilisation. 36 The most far-reaching attempt at synthesis to date is the 'corporatist' approach, which depicts Republican postwar policy as shaped by an -unchanging -consensus among the 'New Era's' political and commercial elites. US interests were best protected using America's financial power, and informal agents, to pacify Europe by restructuring its component national economies and politics after America's 'corporatist' example. 37 Such an interpretation offers important insights into the domestic roots of US policy and the -partially -'private' structure' of transatlantic relations in the 1920s.
38 More pertinently, it places US economic diplomacy -whose spiritus rector was the long-serving Republican Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover -in the wider context of a more comprehensive US stabilisation policy implemented in Europe from 1923.
What can thus be accentuated is not simply corporatist continuity but, rather, a more complex reorientation process, which progressed and regressed between 1923 and 1929, and culminated in Hughes's bid to realise Wilson's aims by markedly different means. In broad terms, it comprised two stages: first, a recasting of assumptions and ideas in a departure from Wilsonian and earlier Republican paradigms; then, in the face of the Ruhr crisis, a change in strategy and the attempt to bring new concepts to bear on the European conflict from November 1923.
Far from espousing isolationism, Republican foreign policy under Hughes sought to establish a new world order. While leaving the Treaty of Versailles de jure unaltered, he de facto aimed to reform the Versailles system profoundly. As Secretary of State, he characterised his main objective in 1922 as the creation of 'community of ideals, interests and purposes'. 39 It was to include not only the allies of 1918, especially France and Britain, but also the unstable but now democratised, and capitalist, Germany. By contrast, Bolshevik Russia was seen as neither a desirable member of nor a serious threat to this 'community' in the foreseeable future. By the end of 1922, an unspoken 'Hughes Doctrine' guided the Republican quest to consolidate Wilson's unfinished peace. The United States was to become its informal -yet effectively hegemonic -arbiter. In Europe -where after 1919 no vital American security interests were at stake -US policy would limit itself to an unofficial yet officially steered pursuit of hegemonic stability. 41 In 1924, Hughes defined the basic principles of his policy as: 'Independence -that does not mean and never meant isolation. Co-operation -that does not mean and never meant alliances or political entanglements'. 42 Formal entanglement in any universalist 'scheme to prevent war' he regarded as curtailing American independence and as domestically untenable, particularly in view of strong isolationist sentiments in the Republicandominated Congress. He also deemed it inimical to peaceful change and thus harmful both to US interests and European stabilisation, which were inconceivable without such change. This dualism remained a hallmark of Hughes' aims. 43 Gradually, following the deterioration of Franco-German relations after the abortive Genoa conference of 1922, the hitherto predominantly economic orientation of US foreign policy, steadfastly advocated by Hoover, began to change.
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Chiefly spurred on by Hughes, a truly Republican strategy for Franco-German accommodation and European consolidation came to the fore, evolving into one of the most influential approaches to international politics in the twentieth century. This was the strategy to internationalise a 'progressive' model of pragmatic international co-operation, derived from American Progressive ideas and Hughes's own domestic reform agenda as Republican governor of New York before the war and presidential candidate in 1916. In his eyes, progressivism was germane to a reform of the international system and would be sustained by the pragmatic, step-by-step 'effort to diminish among people the disposition to resort to force and to find a just and reasonable basis for accord '. 45 Hughes advanced the closest approximation of a US 'grand design' to this end in his landmark New Haven speech of 29 December 1922. Proposing a programmatic alternative to what he saw as Poincaré's hazardous course, he emphasised that there could be 'no economic recuperation in Europe unless Germany recuperates'. 46 To prevent a looming Franco-German 'disaster', and ensure the largest possible reparations to the United States' debtors Britain and France, the Secretary of State unveiled the aforementioned 'expert plan' prepared by himself and his right hand, the head of the State Department's west European desk, William Castle. 47 The plan 41 essentially sought to take the settlement of the reparations conflict out of the sphere of power politics and put it into the hands of 'independent' financial 'experts of the highest authority'. They were to assess 'objectively' Germany's 'actual capacity to pay' and suggest 'advisable mechanisms for an efficient transfer of reparations'.
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From Washington's perspective, this seemed the only realistic path to an intergovernmental reparations agreement. This reorientation of Republican strategy, however, only led to concrete changes in policy when the Franco-German crisis rapidly worsened in Europe's 'fateful autumn' of 1923. The United States finally and decisively 'returned' to the European theatre in November 1923, after Hughes's directive of 25 October that 'the time had arrived' for a 'constructive policy'. 49 In concrete terms, Washington now officially endorsed the participation of US experts in the 'independent inquiry' proposed almost one year before. Most prominent among these were Charles Dawes and the businessman Owen Young.
Washington's new course was indubitably influenced by the perception that Poincaré, especially through the so-called MICUM (Inter-Allied Control Commission for Factories and Mines) agreements with German industrialists, wanted to create a closed Rhine-Ruhr 'economic bloc' which clashed with the United States' assertion of an 'open door' in Europe. 50 More profoundly, however, Hughes had concluded that further US aloofness would allow the situation to deteriorate to a point where not merely transatlantic trade but the very foundations of any future European stability could be undermined. 51 Henceforth, he became a crucial informal arbiter, beginning what J. P. Morgan had demanded ever since 1922 and what only politicians could do: to create the political preconditions for a success of the envisaged expert 'design'. 52 This was indeed achieved: the United States' forward engagement galvanised European 'high politics', providing the crystallisation point lacking ever since 1919.
Once expert deliberations had begun in December 1923, Hughes returned to a policy of 'neutrality', underscoring that Washington would not become a 'dictator in the reparations problem'. 53 Nevertheless, after the United States had set the rules, telling the Europeans either to accept the experts' recommendations or forfeit US support, it became almost inevitable that Poincaré's attempt to retain French predominance on the premises of 1919 would be frustrated. Far less of a foregone conclusion, however, was that this shift would also bring about tangible political stabilisation. Essentially, this could only be achieved because US efforts were complemented by Britain's self-interested brokerage between the United States, France and Germany. It fell to Labour prime minister MacDonald not merely to bring 48 See FRUS 1922 Paris and Berlin in line behind the Dawes report of 9 April 1924 but to prepare the political ground for a sustainable reparations settlement.
MacDonald's pursuit of an evolutionary transformation of postwar politics
MacDonald's direction of Britain's external relations in 1924, as prime minister and as his own foreign secretary, marked a watershed in the evolution of British postwar policy. His was a departure both from Lloyd George's unrealistic 'grand designs' for reconstructing Europe, and from the Conservative Foreign Secretary Curzon's passive 'neutrality' policy of 1923. Yet MacDonald's impact on Euro-Atlantic politics has long been neglected, if at all, only raised, in the context of the broader dispute over British 'appeasement'. How tenable, then, is the assertion that MacDonald was instrumental in imposing a reparations settlement on France that suited Anglo-US finance but proved ominous for French, and European, security?
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During his nine months in office MacDonald was hardly in a position to sustain a long-term strategy. Nonetheless, he did in effect devise Britain's first coherent policy of peaceful change after the Great War. And, in contrast to Curzon as well as Chamberlain, he was the only leading British policy maker whose approach met the central challenge of the 1920s: he sought transatlantic solutions to political and financial problems that could no longer be mastered by the Europeans alone.
Eventually, MacDonald departed from the previous British policy of maintaining, however grudgingly, a superficial entente with France and the -by 1923, clearly untenable -status quo of Versailles. Like Hughes, he pursued instead a bid to turn the order of 1919, which he regarded merely as a temporary 'armistice', into a 'real peace'. 55 He sought to achieve this by fostering a process of evolutionary integration. 56 To this end, and to enhance French and German security, MacDonald made it a priority of his government to forge a new pragmatic partnership with the United States. His core aim remained to draw Weimar Germany into a reformed Euro-Atlantic 'society' of democratic nations. 57 Prima facie, MacDonald's approach to international politics seems characterised by a notable tension between principle and practice. Originally, the war had only strengthened the left-liberal convictions he had espoused as a prominent internationalist in the ranks of the Independent Labour Party (ILP): the time was ripe for a new world order and the League of Nations should be its universal agent of peace. 58 As prime minister, however, he opted for a decidedly pragmatic course, and his idealism was increasingly superseded by what became most distinct about 54 Cf. Schuker, The End, 237 ff. 55 his policies: his evolutionary outlook on how to improve the relations between the victors and vanquished of a disastrous war. In 1918, he had seen no British traditions worth building on. He had condemned a 'frame of mind' that sought to restore order through a 'Holy Alliance' of statesmen while only feigning 'democratic language'. 59 By late 1923, he had come to champion nothing other than a new form of just such co-operation: that between the governments and financiers representing the most important Euro-Atlantic powers. Of course, these were by then governments of democratic states and MacDonald from the beginning aimed to include Germany's representatives. Significantly, this concerted approach, rather than the League of Nations, had in his eyes become Europe's first best hope for peace. 60 This was at the heart of the lessons drawn by the Labour prime minister from Europe's postwar turmoil. His path can indeed be seen as one of the most idiosyncratic learning processes in the 1920s.
MacDonald consistently underlined the importance of psychological factors in international politics, noting in July 1924 that 'Unless we change the qualities of our minds we had better arm to the teeth'. 61 This, however, could not be achieved through abstract covenants, only through concrete co-operation. 62 MacDonald's pragmatism was clearly reinforced through the Ruhr conflict. As leader of the Labour opposition he had criticised Curzon's passivity and advocated a forceful British intervention against Poincaré's incursions. He warned that, unless Britain checked France, the crisis would only benefit those eager to topple Weimar's democratic government and provoke another continental war. 63 MacDonald later noted that 'the worst form of German nationalism was the result of the way that Germany had been handled by the Allies' ever since 1919. 64 Like Hughes, he dreaded the spectre of Germany's political and territorial disintegration and its consequences for British trade and prosperity. 65 MacDonald thus regarded the Germans as -not entirely blameless -'underdogs' in the conflict with France. He sympathised with figures like President Friedrich Ebert and the Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, whom he came to see as guardians of Weimar's embattled republic. 66 It should be underlined, then, that MacDonald's resolve to accommodate Germany did not prefigure British policy towards Hitler. His main assumption was precisely the opposite: the Weimar Republic had to be stabilised to forestall its replacement by an anti-democratic regime. 67 On these premises, and forcefully seconded by the eminence grise of British foreign policy, the Foreign Office permanent under-secretary Sir Eyre Crowe, the new prime minister from January 1924 took not only Britain's European policy but also its cooperation with the elusive US partner to a new level. 68 He swiftly implemented a two-pronged strategy of peaceful change. His long-term objective remained that of transforming the League of Nations into a flexible system of collective security. In the short term, however, and under the leitmotif of gradual reform, he pursued two clear priorities. On the one hand, he sought to engage the United States in preparing the ground for a multilateral reparations agreement. He thus wholeheartedly backed the American 'expert' approach, demanding the unconditional implementation of the Dawes report. 69 On the other, he embarked on separate negotiations, first with Poincaré, then with his socialist successor Edouard Herriot and Stresemann, to initiate what in fact became the first Franco-German peace process after the war. It was to be a process in which French leaders and Weimar's 'moral elite' -in MacDonald's eyes 'sincere spirits who were truly democratic' -had to participate on a basis of equality.
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The British premier reasoned that a 'comprehensive policy' preventing further diktats by Poincaré would be a first critical step towards enhanced European security. 71 This, however, could only be advanced under the auspices, and control, of Britain and the United States. The divisive politics of Versailles had to be replaced by a new transatlantic concert. With Crowe's support, MacDonald carefully co-ordinated his efforts with the Coolidge administration, notably Hughes. He also relied on the leverage of J. P. Morgan and the Bank of England's influential governor, Montagu Norman, who strongly pressed for a reparations settlement. Yet the rationale of his strategy remained the reverse of Hughes's. MacDonald backed America's 'depoliticisation' scheme precisely to revive the paralysed political accommodation between the Western powers and Germany. As its culmination he proposed a 'conference in chief ', to be held in London in July 1924. He hoped that 'America might be represented' there as well. 72 In the critical phase of May-June 1924, MacDonald succeeded in furthering Washington's espousal of this agenda while preparing the ground for Germany's return to the international negotiating In fact, even in France the outcome of the London conference was soon perceived as a major positive turning-point in postwar politics, marking the end of prolonged crisis and promising the onset of an era of consolidation. Herriot defended the settlement as an unavoidable accommodation not only with Germany but also with the Anglo-US powers, and he won a clear majority for it in parliament. 76 In the United States, and Germany, the grand bargain of London was regarded as the initiation of a distinctly 'American Peace' in Europe. 77 The Coolidge administration quickly claimed it as a success of US policy. 78 Labour's 'iron chancellor', Philip Snowden, by contrast, insisted that British mediation had been the decisive factor in achieving a 'new deal' for Europe: the Labour government had managed to 'co-opt' the resources of the New World to redress the crisis of the Old.
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A systemic analysis which seeks to be precise about London's impact on EuroAtlantic politics suggests that London was indeed far from a second 'Treaty of Frankfurt' for France. Under intense international and domestic pressure, Herriot undoubtedly suffered some tactical defeats. 80 As will be shown, he had to make difficult adjustments, especially concerning the Ruhr glacis. Overall, however, German gains were by no means tantamount to French losses; the settlement of 1924 was everything but an upshot of zero-sum diplomacy. Rather, it constituted a 'new deal' for Europe, especially for Germany's, and France's, economic and political consolidation in the 1920s. Hence forward, not only French security but also Europe's financial and political stabilisation were no longer predicated on Germany's containment but on its inclusion into a nascent international system. Within this framework, agreements were reached both through Anglo-American pressure and, decisively, through mutual compromise. Unquestionably, this also served core political-cum-financial interests of Britain and the United States, and both were required to compromise least. 74 It has long been maintained that the outcome of London was chiefly determined by the power of Anglo-American financiers. 81 By contrast, the influence of official policy makers has been rated low. Only the bankers could advance the initial loan decisive for realising the Dawes scheme, and financial pressure had a marked impact on the negotiations. But this pressure was primarily catalytic. Policy makers used it very effectively to expedite political solutions. More substantive change stemmed from the establishment of new rules as to Euro-Atlantic relations. MacDonald, Hughes and his envoy Kellogg were the only actors in a position to promote crucial complex bargains which made a final settlement sustainable not only in financial but also in political terms.
Concretely, what policy makers had to bring about, and what bankers could only 'assist with', was a resolution of the conference's three cardinal questions. 82 The first, dominating the conference's initial inter-allied negotiations until 2 August, was the sanction question. At stake was whether France would retain, through the Reparations Commission, the power to enforce sanctions should Germany default on reparations, or whether the United States would become the arbiter in this key postwar issue. The second key question, overshadowing the second conference phase until 15 August, was the question on what conditions, and when, France would end the Ruhr occupation. It pertained to the very geopolitical premises of future FrancoGerman relations and European security. There was one further key question, which was on what terms, if at all, Germany -hitherto an 'object' of victors' politicswould participate in the proceedings.
That these questions could be settled was ultimately a concerted achievement. The London settlement was the initiation of an Anglo-US peace, and provided the framework for the first Franco-German compromise agreement after the war. It basically resulted from a novel interplay between Britain as the politically pivotal power and the United States as the indispensable underwriter peaceful change in Europe. It would pave the way, and create the need, for Locarno.
The American strategy of resolving political conflicts by politically administering economic means had lent itself to clearing the thorny path towards a reparations settlement on 'rational' business terms, thus providing a decisive initial impetus. This was subtly orchestrated by Hughes, who once again acted as informal arbiter, first from Washington, then, at the height of the negotiations, London, where he was officially attending the annual convention of the American Bar Association. 83 He made Washington's influence felt through three channels: first, through the US delegation and its head, Ambassador Kellogg; second, by relying on US bankers, above all J. P. Morgan and his associate Thomas Lamont; and, finally, by engaging in direct behind-the-scenes negotiations with German and French leaders. His chief objective remained to see the Dawes plan implemented without any undesirable political interference or 'measures of compulsion'; France was to evacuate the Ruhr, Germany to accept the new reparations regime without preconditions. 84 The British contribution to the London agreement -hitherto underrated -was no less critical. MacDonald's diplomacy turned the US scheme, essentially a set of financial prescriptions, into a fully-fledged political settlement. This, and ensuring that it would be concluded with the Germans meeting 'the allies in conference', had remained the Labour prime minister's underlying aims. 85 As the aftermath of London revealed, only such an agreement could set Euro-Atlantic politics on a course of reform. For, crucially, it could be legitimated not just in Anglo-American financial circles but also, if with difficulty, in French -and German -domestic politics. 86 At the London conference the twin processes of 'depoliticisation' and political accommodation that were altering Euro-Atlantic relations reached their first peak. As both British and American policy makers realised from the outset, the London protocol had not as yet yielded conclusive 'answers' to either the reparations conundrum or the Franco-German problem. But the agreements signed in midAugust and implemented in the autumn of 1924 did provide, with the Dawes scheme, a mechanism -albeit preliminary -for managing what had been at the root of Europe's postwar crisis. The new modus operandi reduced Germany's obligations in accordance with its 'actual capacity to pay' and allowed for the decisive initial US transfer of capital to Germany. This quickly resulted in a lopsided transatlantic cycle of financial stabilisation: Germany largely used US funds to pay reparations to France and Britain, with which the latter could in turn pay off their war debts to the world's new lender of last resort. 87 Due to Washington's unwillingness to establish effective political control and bailout mechanisms for loans, this system eventually became susceptible to collapse in the event of a major crisis. This would have grave consequences after 1928 which were neither inevitable nor foreseeable in 1924. The more important point to make here is that, without the Dawes regime, not even a 'relative consolidation' of Weimar Germany, and Europe, would have been possible in the first place. And this became a tangible reality between 1924 and 1928.
Appraised solely for its effect on Europe's 'balance of power', the 'economic peace' of London, not rescinded thereafter, had recast the distribution of means and possibilities between Germany and France. At the same time, it had altered the very basis for a stable peace order in the 1920s. One definite answer to the Franco-German question had been given: European, and particularly French, security could no longer be founded on a containment of Germany. Rather, it was set to retain its political and economic unity -with as yet disputed borders in west and east -and to restore its inherently predominant capabilities. Besides, bypassing the then economically ailing France, it had bound up its economic and financial interests very effectively with those of the United States and Britain. 88 The most tangible systemic shift in international power was that from August 1924 onwards France was de facto deprived of its sanction prerogatives under the Versailles system. This accorded exactly with Hughes's main conference objective. 89 Henceforth, sanctions against Germany were economic, and whether they were imposed was no longer decided by France, or Britain, but by the United States. Concretely, decisions would be made by a steering committee no longer set up under Versailles but under the Dawes scheme and headed by the new 'King of the Dawes Plan', the US financier Seymour Parker Gilbert.
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Following this compromise Chancellor Wilhelm Marx and Stresemann finally received the keenly awaited invitation to London. This was not due to the bankers, who maintained that they were 'fighting' the German 'fights' more efficiently than the German government could. 91 Rather, on the one hand, there was a further reorientation of US policy under Hughes, who realised more clearly than before that 'depoliticisation' had its limits and that the Dawes plan could only be made acceptable to both Paris and Berlin if not only French but also German leaders had a stake in it. To draw Germany into the London process, on 3 August Hughes took the unprecedented step of holding preliminary talks with Marx and Stresemann in Berlin. 92 On the other hand, and crucially, London saw the culmination of MacDonald's consistent bid to promote Germany's postwar rehabilitation. By overcoming pressure from both Herriot and the Anglo-US bankers to exclude the Germans and secure a swift Allied agreement, the prime minister secured perhaps the most important breakthrough of London. The participation of a German delegation in the conference's final sessions led to an agreement that, in MacDonald's words, had 'greater moral value than the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles'. 93 When French and German leaders negotiated for the first time since 1918, grappling with the thorny Ruhr evacuation issue from 6 August, the need for Anglo-US mediation became most obvious. While counting on the bankers' co-operation, only official mediators could enforce the indispensable ground-rules and provide the necessary incentives -political and financial support -for what Kellogg called 'the politics of quid pro quo'. 94 And they built narrow but passable bridges towards compromise that both Herriot and Stresemann could cross without appearing to have 'sold out' vital national interests. 95 In line with J. P. Morgan, Snowden and Norman had encouraged Stresemann to insist that France withdraw in three-month stages and complete withdrawal in far less than a year. McDonald and Kellogg, however, seized on the bankers' demands in their eventually decisive bid not to impose them on France. For this would have undermined Herriot domestically and thus wrecked the entire process.
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They induced Herriot to make the final concession of proposing a maximal transition period of one year for the evacuation. 97 On 15 August, having consulted with President Ebert in Berlin, the German delegation eventually agreed. 98 Thus, a hardwon compromise had been reached. Albeit at first less than satisfactory for either side, its result would never be reversed. France de facto relinquished the Ruhr glacis by 1 August 1925 -less than a year after London.
In effecting these substantial changes, the Anglo-US stabilisation policies of 1924 had by no means eliminated the structural asymmetry between the preponderance of power actually possessed by France and Germany's significantly greater potential. But it is worth emphasising that any efforts at creating a more sustainable international system without breaking up Germany, and perpetuating the disorder of 1923, had to create ground-rules and mechanisms to balance the unsettling consequences of this disequilibrium. In these terms the London accords marked a veritable caesura in post-First World War international relations. Above all, the 'new deal' of 1924 was the first major settlement after the war that had not been imposed on the vanquished by the victors.
Instead, under Anglo-US auspices a series of complex multilateral bargains had been made -on terms generally acceptable to France -which laid the groundwork for a more far-reaching process of international accommodation between Weimar Germany and the western powers. An integrative process had been initiated that would determine the course of Euro-Atlantic politics until the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. This superseded France's earlier bids to preserve the Versailles system in all critical respects and, in this sense, confirms MacDonald's verdict on the London accords: 'This agreement may be regarded as the first Peace Treaty, because we sign it with a feeling that we have turned our backs on the terrible years of war 94 
A European security question on new premises
As the aftermath of the London Conference revealed, and as British policy makers perceived more acutely than their US counterparts, their joint efforts had improved the preconditions but also created a new urgency for attempts to address the underlying European security problem. Until the nadir of the Ruhr crisis, the challenge had been the unsettled state of international relations, the absence of security per se. After London, the crucial question was whether it would be possible to create a security architecture that could underpin Europe's incipient economic stabilisation and above all the transition of a revitalised Germany towards a stable republican order.
This challenge prompted the further reorientation of British policy under Austen Chamberlain, in his quest for a new European equilibrium, in 1925.
100 By contrast, US policy under Hughes and even more so under Kellogg, who succeeded him as secretary of state in March 1925, returned to a more informal, Progressive approach. Building on the important precedent of 1924, Washington reaccentuated the doctrine of official non-entanglement in European security. What consolidated Europe's 'economic peace', however, was not merely an intra-European endeavour but a second stage in the transformation of Euro-Atlantic international politics of the 1920s. Given the difference in British and US strategies, the nascent Pax AngloAmericana of 1924 did not, or at least not yet, give rise to a 'transatlantic concert' in the sense of a coherent international system. Rather, a two-dimensional stabilisation process -or rather two in fact highly interlocking processes of political and economic stabilisation -gained momentum. The Locarno pact was only realised because each of these processes reinforced the other.
The most conspicuous development was the first serious -and (west) Europeanattempt after 1918 to forge a security system including Germany. And it was mainly fostered by Chamberlain's diplomacy. Yet Locarno politics may well have remained futile without -and had in fact only been made possible by -a second process, namely the political-cum-financial consolidation process initiated and overseen by the United States.
Although insufficiently acknowledged, it was the powerful behind-the-scenes support, and pressure, of Washington and US high finance that were instrumental in buttressing the Locarno negotiations, especially during their most severe crisis in June-July 1925.
101 US influence was made felt by Kellogg but also by the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Benjamin Strong, who became a key figure in this phase. Both men recognised a vital US interest in promoting the security pact as a political 'insurance' of the Dawes settlement -and Europe's Progressive consolidation. 102 The Locarno pact would become the nucleus of a regional security system, based on the triangular concert of Britain, France and a reintegrated Germany. But this concert emerged, and was only possible, within a changing international system, which was ultimately, and not only financially, dominated by the United States. In this sense, the at first glance exclusively European Locarno process of 1925 always had a distinct transatlantic dimension as well. And this was only a beginning.
In the domain of 'classic' security politics, the Coolidge administration reaffirmed its anti-Wilsonian premises, which led to a Eurocentric development of international politics after London. In autumn 1924, Kellogg rejected outright the initiative pursued by MacDonald and Herriot to reassure France by turning the League of Nations at last, through the so-called Geneva Protocol, into Europe's central agency of collective security. 103 In essence, the State Department suspected the emergence of a 'new holy alliance' under the guise of the protocol's 'tightened' regime of obligatory sanctions. This not only threatened to affect US 'independence' in the American hemisphere but also to cement the European status quo, thus obstructing further peaceful change.
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What reinforced such notions was the fact that for Republican policy makers the Dawes approach had acquired a no less than paradigmatic character. Such an approach appealed precisely because it promised to further the stabilisation objectives of the informal hegemon without entangling the United States in any formal commitments. Creating interdependent interests with a republican Germany that espoused US-style capitalism, and standards of pacific settlement, appeared to hold the key to overcoming Europe's postwar security dilemma. In US eyes, the best guarantee for France was that Weimar's new political and economic elites -who continued to depend on US loans -had a stake in sustaining their western orientation. 105 After the success of London, there was thus a high -and, in retrospect, excessivedegree of confidence in the self-invigorating dynamism of financially driven stabilisation and business co-operation. There was even the notion, asserted most vigorously by Hoover, that the pre-1914 Pax Britannica could be replaced by a Pax Americana. Under the auspices of the US administration semi-official representatives like Parker Gilbert would steer the process of Europe's progressive modernisation following the US example. 106 In Germany, rather than France, the United States de facto created a 'penetrated system', as the main creditor significantly encroaching upon German sovereignty and controlling the new reparations regime.
The underlying continuity in the United States' Progressive policy was accentuated by Kellogg, who backed his predecessor's line unequivocally. Rather than advance transatlantic co-operation further, however, he felt that, by the time he took over the State Department in March 1925, Europe's pacification was progressing so satisfactorily that he could scale down the United States' active engagement. In October 1924 he had outlined to Coolidge the main lessons he had learned in Europe. He had concluded that US policy had 'much more influence' if it maintained its 'freedom of action' while 'co-operating in the friendliest spirit'. The United States 'could [not] have accomplished so much in the Dawes Plan settlement if we had been parties in the League and . . . tied up in European politics'. 
Chamberlain's bid for a new European equilibrium
With an international constellation in flux, it mainly fell to Britain to find a new 'answer' to the altered European security question of the mid-1920s. Facing this challenge, Chamberlain, the new foreign secretary in Baldwin's second government, in December 1924 chose to abandon MacDonald's support for the Geneva Protocol. According to the assessment finally prevailing in the influential Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), which reflected US misgivings, the Protocol challenged paramount national interests by limiting British sovereignty and obliging it to enforce 'automatic sanction clauses' under an amended League Covenant. The Conservative government refused to underpin an undesirably 'rigid' order of collective security reinforcing the status quo of 1919 in Europe as a whole. 109 Chamberlain's alternative design to overcome Franco-German insecurity, his 'noble' policy of appeasement which led to Locarno, has received markedly divergent evaluations. Most influentially, 'realists' have branded it as the pursuit of an ill-founded compromise between regional and collective security at the expense of an entente with France. In their view, Locarno created a deceptive truce in western Europe and borders of inferior validity in the east, so setting the stage for a violent revision of Versailles in the 1930s.
110 More recent interpretations, however, have cast a more benign light on Chamberlain's quest, praising it as the 'painful attempt' undertaken in the 1920s to return to 'the best of the old [prewar] order' -and to revive the Anglo-French entente as its 'central axis '. 111 Yet, evaluating Chamberlain's Locarno policy under the leitmotif of peaceful change suggests that it was neither a flawed attempt to escape the realities of Europe's post-1918 'balance of power' nor a laudable return to its pre-1914 roots. Rather, it was a conscious quest to build on traditions of British policy that had shaped the peace order of 1814/15 and to create, in the 1920s, a new concert system integrating Germany on terms acceptable to France. It was an idiosyncratic, and notably Eurocentric, attempt to draw positive consequences from the previous frustrations of British postwar policy under Lloyd George and Curzon.
To understand what the reorientation of British foreign policy in 1924/25 owed to Chamberlain's personal approach, rather than an overarching continuity of British appeasement, it is worth emphasising that there were markedly differing visions of Britain's desirable European role in Baldwin's cabinet. One -imperialist -school of thought, represented by cabinet members such as the Colonial Secretary Leo Amery and Winston Churchill, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, clearly regarded the empire as Britain's pre-eminent concern. They advocated a 'policy of aloofness' from Europe until a 'natural balance of forces' had re-established itself between France and Germany. 112 Another faction, aptly characterised as 'little Englander' and represented by influential figures such as the cabinet secretary Maurice Hankey, was equally opposed to any binding commitments in Europe, advocating domestic retrenchment instead. 113 It was to a large extent against these tides of Conservativé elite opinion that Chamberlain, aided by the still influential under-secretary Sir Eyre Crowe, developed and implemented his strategy of reviving Britain's role as a European power. 114 Chamberlain's reorientation was hardly a linear process. Nor did it mark a radical departure from British traditions of liberal hegemony. Yet it transcended mere contingency and amounted to a significant change in the principles and objectives shaping British policy after 1919. Just before assuming office in the autumn of 1924, Chamberlain had still favoured a balance-of-power approach predicated on the imperative to preserve the treaty of 1919 as 'the . . . only possible basis of . . . Europe's law'. 115 His overriding concern had been Germany's 'latent' revisionism, coupled with its overbearing demographic and economic strength. Less likely, yet still disconcerting, was a putative German drift towards a revisionist entente with Soviet Russia. Chamberlain had therefore considered an alliance with France as the best guarantee of European security. 116 an important stimulus, his new design was not simply compatible with the German proposals, but developed them further. 118 Chamberlain's guiding notion amounted to a reassertion of Britain's capabilities as Europe's 'honest broker'. He asserted 'that Great Britain has it in her power at this moment to bring peace to Europe. To achieve this end two things are indispensable: 1. that we should remove or allay French fears; 2. that we should bring Germany back into the concert of Europe'. 119 By this time, it had become an axiom of his policy that neither was sufficient by itself yet that the latter -fostering Germany's espousal of British rules of peaceful change and the renunciation of violent revision -was clearly inconceivable without the former. 120 Conversely, he feared that, lacking British reassurance, French leaders would feel compelled to repeat Poincaré's provocations towards its eastern neighbour -and Britain would then be 'dragged along, unwilling, impotent, in the wake of France towards the new Armageddon'.
121
Put in perspective, then, Chamberlain's 'noble policy of appeasement' was not the outgrowth of internationalist idealism. It rested on the premise that, by acting as Europe's arbiter mediating between France and Germany, Britain was best positioned to limit a highly undesirable security commitment in terms of military power and economic resources. Not least, the Foreign Secretary considered the latter as impossible to legitimate in the eyes of the Conservative Cabinet, Parliament and the British public at large. Moreover, Britain could hope to restrict even this limited guarantee to what was deemed Europe's strategically vital western part, which at this critical juncture included Germany. 123 In essence, Chamberlain would endeavour to emulate Castlereagh in adopting a policy of forward engagement in Europe. It was to be premised on a consistent British commitment to shaping Europe's international system and fostering an international equilibrium, a balance of status and possibilities between powers of markedly disparate power capabilities -above all Britain, France and Germany. He opted against intervening only to readjust a 'mechanical' balance of power -and thereby deal with the consequences of Europe's foreseeable regression into crisis and possibly another war. 124 In principle and practice, then, Chamberlain began to depart from the 'logic' of Versailles. Yet how far did his approach meet the requirements of stabilisation after 1918? As the Dawes process had demonstrated, in an era when the international economy and security were inextricably linked, one newly pertinent criterion was the extent of Britain's capacity to co-operate with the United States. It is worth noting, then, that Chamberlain's reorientation failed to trigger a new readiness to sustain the fledgling Anglo-US collaboration of 1923-24. In 1925 -admittedly in a phase when US policy regressed to a course of official non-involvement -he saw no benefit in engaging the United States' political-cum-financial power to further the security pact. 125 After MacDonald, there was a return to more traditional patterns of British particularism -and the distancing of a long-established foreign-policy culture from one regarded as 'arriviste'. This had marked Lloyd George's as well as Conservative policy towards Washington after Versailles. 126 Even if a latent naval competition had been moderated by the Anglo-US agreement underpinning the Washington system of 1922, and a war-debt settlement concluded in 1923, a submerged rivalry between the old and the newly rising hegemonic power persisted. This affected policy makers more than the closely co-operating financial elites. 127 Chamberlain saw US foreign policy as the pursuit of narrow economic interests without the political will and wherewithal to play a constructive part in international security. In March 1925, he noted: 'With America withdrawn, or taking part only where her interests are directly concerned in the collection of money, Great Britain is the only possible influence for peace and stabilisation'. 128 Consequently, while throughout 1925 there were continuous consultations between Chamberlain and Kellogg, neither seriously envisaged a transatlantic concert of powers. 129 However Eurocentric Chamberlain's outlook was, most likely no British policymaker could have altered Washington's consistent refusal to become a direct guarantor of European stability. Under Chamberlain's leadership, the security pact negotiations therefore evolved essentially along European lines and without any formal US participation. From a systemic vantage-point, however, Chamberlain benefited considerably not only from the United States' intervention in 1924 but also from its continued informal engagement in 1925. Overall, US influence -financial leverage and incentives combined with behind-the-scenes political pressure -expedited the Locarno process not decisively but significantly. 130 As a still effective 'background force', it was particularly important in overcoming obstacles in international and, even more so, domestic politics in both France and Germany.
Precisely because by spring 1925 the Dawes regime had triggered an ever-growing influx of American capital into Germany, and thus ever more intertwined economic interests, there was a growing US awareness that Europe's nascent Pax Americana required political safeguards. 131 Yet both Kellogg and the influential William Castle felt that establishing such safeguards fell squarely into the area of responsibility of the European governments.
132 Kellogg thus quickly welcomed the German proposal for a pact 'to guarantee French security' when first officially notified of it on 16 March 1925.
133 This was a welcome alternative both to the Geneva Protocol and a resurfacing of European alliance politics under French influence.
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Instead of becoming the Rhine pact's formal 'trustee', Washington joined with US high finance in furthering Chamberlain's negotiations with Aristide Briand and Stresemann largely by the same informal means that they had used so effectively in 1924: political-cum-financial influence and capital. The Americans pursued a 'carrotand-stick' strategy: Kellogg relied on both US diplomats and financiers to underscore the United States' keen interest in the pact's success. Most important among these were the new US ambassador in London, Alanson Houghton, and Benjamin Strong, who became the United States' most powerful agent in Europe.
Houghton on 4 May delivered what became widely publicised as 'America's peace ultimatum to Europe', calling on 'the peoples of Europe' to lay the foundations for 'permanent peace' if they wanted to continue benefiting from US loans. 135 For his part, Strong repeatedly travelled to Germany, providing the new Hans Luther government with crucial support, particularly in curbing nationalist opposition to the pact. American leverage proved vital when, in July 1925, the pre-Locarno process threatened to collapse after France's original response to Stresemann's initiative 130 Earlier studies paid scant attention to the impact of America's unofficial influence on European security politics in the mid-1920s. Cf 137 In Berlin, Stresemann seized upon US demands in his efforts to win the backing of the German National Party (DNVP). On 20 July, he declared in the Reichstag that unless Germany extended its 'co-operation with the financially powerful states, with America' he foresaw an 'economic breakdown in Germany that would have uncontrollable repercussions'. 138 Ultimately, however, it was Chamberlain's efforts as self-styled 'honest broker' between France and Germany that proved decisive for clearing the diplomatic path to Locarno in the summer and autumn of 1925.
139 Despite Britain's unwillingness to make automatically binding security commitments, he was the only policy maker who could offer Briand the essential modicum of reassurance. His mediation allowed the 'triumvirate' of Locarno to turn Stresemann's security initiative into a qualitatively new peace system. 140 Without Britain's engagement, the pact would most probably have remained stillborn.
Locarno -the European pillar of the unfinished transatlantic peace order
What, then, did Locarno politics achieve? Did Locarno's outcome accord with what Chamberlain had hoped to achieve and the Coolidge administration sought to buttress? Or did it rather undermine the security of France and, even more so, of France's eastern allies Poland and Czechoslovakia? Essentially, Britain had fostered the second, and this time even more far-reaching, Franco-German deal of the 1920s. To allay French security concerns, Germany recognised the existing Franco-German status quo on the Rhine. At the same time, it unequivocally renounced a forcible revision of the eastern borders, but not their alteration per se -if this could be achieved in a peaceful manner. To this end, Stresemann signed bilateral arbitration treaties not only with France and Belgium but also with Poland and Czechoslovakia. 141 By way of quid pro quo, France recognised Germany's claim to become again, albeit gradually, an 'equal' European great power. While formally unaltered, the unstable system of 1919 had thus in fact been significantly complemented. Since one of the pact's central provisions was that Germany should enter the League of Nations the following year, on the tacit understanding that it would become a permanent member of its council, the Locarno treaties, and Germany's new status, were interlocked with the League Covenant's provisions of collective security. 142 Following the British rationale, the société des nations from 1926 essentially became a stage for the concert diplomacy pursued by Chamberlain, Briand and Stresemann, not a newly empowered mechanism of supranational European security.
Crucially, the stabilising impact of the transformation furthered by Locarno was not limited to western Europe. Contrary to much that has been written since 1925, Locarno also opened up the possibility of setting Germany's relations with its eastern neighbours -and the means of solving mutual conflicts -on a new footing: renunciation of force, pacific settlement, peaceful change, if, and only if, this was reconcilable with consolidating the emerging European peace order as a whole. Arguably, Locarno thus also offered the best prospects for Polish and Czechoslovak security, and their peaceful coexistence with Germany, in the interwar period. Doubtless, however, this was not universally perceived at the time, certainly not in Poland, and progress towards an 'eastern Locarno' would remain one of the hardest tests after 1925.
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At Locarno, Chamberlain effectively made the most substantial British commitment to European security since the First World War. It was the most far-reaching commitment possible under the constraints imposed by the need for retrenchment and his government's unwillingness to extend, and legitimate, formal guarantees beyond Britain's western security glacis. Yet Chamberlain acted on the clear assumption that the nature of the pact was such that Britain would be called upon to fulfil it politically but not to honour it militarily in the foreseeable future. 144 In his speech on the treaties before the Commons on 18 November 1925, Chamberlain could thus claim with some justification: 'I do not think that the obligations of this country could be more narrowly circumscribed to the vital national interests than they are in the Treaty of Locarno'.
Germany's 'security initiative', most urgently a swift 'liberation' of the Rhenish occupation zones. 146 Briand interpreted Locarno as a pact fortifying the newly settled status quo on the basis of Versailles -and forestalling further revisions as long as possible, particularly regarding the strategically sensitive Rhineland.
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Such differences, however, are neither uncommon in international history nor necessarily the prima causa for the disintegration of peace orders -as long as there is a mechanism in place by which different aims can be balanced and, as far as possible, reconciled. Chamberlain for one had begun to recognise what was one of the gravest diplomatic challenges after the Great War: the need to broker compromises that could be sustained not only in international but also in domestic politics. 148 Locarno was the second settlement, after London, between Germany and the western powers that resulted from a peace process between -more or less stable -democratic states. Its protagonists were obliged to win approval from three distinctly different parliamentary systems and national environments.
What was thus called for was a system of international politics allowing for complex procedures. Locarno had to bear fruit -fast, yet not too fast -to give both Weimar's and the Third Republic's moderate elites an interest in sustaining the Franco-German peace process. With hindsight, Chamberlain was not mistaken in reckoning that Stresemann's Westpolitik sought to regain international equality and economic clout, not military preponderance. 149 Fundamentally, what had to be consolidated in Germany was a more far-reaching transition process -a process of westernisation. Yet, as should be emphasised even if obvious, the time Weimar and the Locarno system de facto had in which to consolidate was highly constrained. Europe's was a short 'era of relative stability' until 1929. 150 The larger question raised here thus pertains to the limits of what a sound international system can at best achieve, particularly in terms of stabilising not only international order but also the domestic politics and economies of its major actors. As Weimar's demise after 1929 would dramatically demonstrate, international crisis coupled with internal radicalisation may be the root cause for a descent into aggressive power politics and war.
It can certainly be maintained that Chamberlain came away from Locarno with too great a belief in the effectiveness and legitimacy of what professional diplomacy alone could accomplish. More importantly, however, at the very time when he called Locarno 'the beginning, and not the end, of the noble work of appeasement in Europe', he had in private already begun to follow a different premise. 151 United States. In this sense, not the security pact alone, as Chamberlain would have it, but the combined achievements of London and Locarno marked 'the real dividing line between the years of war and the years of peace' in post-First World War Europe. 155 In sum, then, what began to stabilise Europe in the mid-1920s were two interdependent and complementary transformation processes. There would have been no Locarno pact without the initial impetus of London and Anglo-US cooperation in 1923-24. Conversely, this impulse would have been ephemeral without Locarno. British and US policy makers, and their French and German counterparts, had started to pursue new ways of peaceful change because the postwar status quo had proved inherently unstable. Theirs can indeed be characterised as a -in many respects limited -learning process, attempts to draw lessons not only from the war and the 'truncated peace of Versailles' but also from the Franco-German crisis it left in its wake. The upshot was a tangible gain in European stability and security: the founding of a nascent transatlantic peace order between 1923 and 1925.
Thus refocused, a comparative analysis allows a re-assessment of the significance of the 1920s, marking it as a formative decade in the attempts to forge a more sustainable Euro-Atlantic international system in the twentieth century. For it anticipated the terms on which more durable stability could be achieved in the West after 1945 -and in Europe as a whole after the end of the Cold War. The central challenge for international politics has remained that of overcoming Europe's divisions: to create, first, a viable peace system in the west and then to extend it, from a western nucleus including Germany, to the east. Euro-Atlantic peace has depended on the creation of a new international equilibrium under the aegis of two pivotal, and more or less benign, powers, rather than on a 'salutary' balance of power. This process has to be understood as evolving originally under the auspices of a 'failing' yet still very potent British power. Even more, however, it was shaped under the auspices of the United States. The twentieth century was to become an American century -yet only after the cataclysm of a second world war.
